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RECENT CASES
CHAMPERTY - Conveyances Made While Land Is In Adverse
Possession of a Third Party. The plaintiff claimed a small parcel of
land and alleged that the defendant had moved a fence approximately
125 feet in order to take in the parcel. The defendant pleaded that
the plaintiff's deed from his grantor was champertous and therefore
void. A motion to set aside a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
was overruled, and the judgment was made final. On appeal, HELD:
Affirmed. The evidence did not sustain the defendant's claim that
the plaintiff's deed was champertous and therefore void. Smith v.
Corun, 268 S.W. 2d 426 (Ky. 1954).
Champerty is a bargain with a litigant for a portion of the matter
sued for, in case of a successful termination of the suit, which the
champertor undertakes to carry on at his own expense rather than
at the expense of the original litigant, and such bargains are illegal.
Nickels v. Kane's Administrator, 82 Va. 309 (1886). Under the
Statutes of 32 Henry VIII Chapter 9, which is thought to be declara-
tory of the common law, a conveyance of land which at the time of
the conveyance is possessed adversely by a third person is cham-
pertous and therefore void. Palmer v. Uhl, 112 Conn. 125, 151 Atl.
355 (1930) ; Rader v. Howell, 246 Ky. 261, 54 S.W. 2d 914 (1932).
This doctrine has been adopted by statute or decision in a minority
of American states. 6 TioaMPsoN ON REAL PROPERTY § 3043, p.
167 (2d ed. 1940); see Annotation, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 729, 758
(1912). A majority of American jurisdictions have refused to recog-
nize the applicability of the common law rule or have changed it by
statute. The instant case was decided in Kentucky, one of the few
states which follow the common law rule.
South Carolina seems to have ruled on this question on only two
occasions. In 1827 the South Carolina Court held that from the
earliest times in this state where one has a good title to lands, he
might convey them to a stranger, without an entry by himself, or any
previous possession by his ancestor, or even having received rent.
Sims v. DeGraffenreid, 4 McCord 253 (S.C. 1827). And some 30
years later the South Carolina Court held that a conveyance by one
out of possession is not void for champerty. Poyas v. Wilkins, 12
Rich. 420 (S.C. 1860). South Carolina's position on the question
seems clear enough until one reads the State's "Real Party in Interest"
470
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statute. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-207. This
statute states "But an action may be maintained by a grantee of land
in the name of the grantor ... when the grant is void by reason of
the actual possession of a person claiming under a title adverse to
that of the grantor at the time of the delivery of the grant . . ."
(Emphasis added.) This seems to indicate that such grants are void
in South Carolina, a directly opposite position from that set out in
the cases cited. However, this inconsistency is probably explained
by the fact that the "Real .Party" statute was copied from the New
York code in 1870. At that time New York had a statute which em-
bodied the common-law rule and made such conveyances void for
champerty. Hopkins v. Baker, 140 App. Div. 460, 125 N.Y.S. 417
(1910). The New York "Real Party" statute was apparently written
with the other New York statute in mind; and when the South Caro-
lina legislature adopted the one without adopting the other, they failed
to remove the language which referred back to the other statute. In-
cidentally, New York now follows the majority rule, having made a
statutory change. NEw YORK REAL PROP. LAW § 260.
In those jurisdictions which consider these conveyances void, the
burden of proving that a deed was executed when the land was held
adversely to the grantor is on the one who is relying on that fact.
Wainwright v. Marbury Lumber Co., 206 Ala. 559, 90 So. 315
(1921). The facts necessary to render a conveyance champertous
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Phillips v.
American Association, 259 Ky. 402, 82 S.W. 2d 456 (1935) ; Ford-
son Coal Co. v. Wells, 245 Ky. 291, 53 S.W. 2d 564 (1932). To
render such a transaction champertous, no particular length of ad-
verse possession is necessary, and no more is required than that the
land was being adversely held at the time of the conveyance. Robin-
son v. Harris, 260 S.W. 2d 404 (Tenn. App. 1952).
Since the instant case was decided in a jurisdiction which considers
these transactions void, the case was undoubtedly correct, as the
defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof. He presented only
weak evidence, while clear and convincing evidence was required to
prove his point. The law upon which this case is based was adopted
at a time when livery of seisin was used to convey land. A good
title to land could not be conveyed unless the owner had possession
as well as legal title to the land. However, in this country, livery
of seisin has not been necessary since early colonial times. The own-
er of land may convey land without evrer having seen it. Therefore,
there seems to be little reason for making a conveyance void just
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because someone else happens to be in possession. Of course if that
third person had already acquired title to the land by adverse pos-
session, the grantor would have nothing to convey, and the grantee
would take nothing. It would seem that the holdings of the two
South Carolina cases are preferable to the law of the instant case.
C. CARTER BYRD.
DEFAMATION - Calling a White Person a Negro in Print. The
defendant corporation published in its newspaper that the plaintiff,
a white woman, was a Negro woman. The article complained of
originated from a police traffic accident report, which did not desig-
nate race. The defendant appealed from a judgment awarding
damages to the plaintiff for libel, contending that referring to a
white person as a Negro is not libelous per se. On appeal, HELD:
Judgment affirmed. This was a case of novel impression in this
jurisdiction. Applying the law of other Southern states, referring
to a white person as a Negro tends to degrade him in society and
lessen him in public esteem, and is therefore libelous per se. Natchez
Tihes Pub. Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 1954).
Any words which falsely or maliciously charge the commission of
a crime, or which distinctly assume or imply or which raise a strong
suspicion in the minds of hearers or readers that one has committed
a crime or which plainly and falsely charge contraction of a con-
tagious disease, adultery, want of chastity, or unfitness in way of a
profession or trade, or any written or printed words which tend to
degrade, disgrace or render a person odious, contemptible or ridicu-
lous are actionable per se. Lesesne v. Willingham, 83 F. Supp. 918
(E.D. S.C. 1949). State v. Farley, 4 IT\lcC. 317 (S.C. 1827), at
page 320, states the rule that "if a man deliberately or maliciously
publish anything concerning another which renders him ridiculous
or tends to hinder others from associating with him or having inter-
course with him an action lies." Calling a white man a mulatto is
actionable per se. Atkinson z. Hartley, 1 McC. 203 (S.C. 1821);
King v. Wood, 1 N. & McC. 184 (S.C. 1818) ; Eden v. Legare, 1
Bay 171 (S.C. 1791). Some jurisdictions hold that it is slander,
actionable per se, to refer to a white person as a Negro orally, and
that it is libelous per se to do so in print. Others maintain a dis-
tinction between the written and spoken word. Many jurisdictions
have confused the terms actionable per se and libelous per se. CLARC,
SUMMARY ov AAERICAN LAW, Torts § 80 (1949). Among cases
[Vol. 7
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holding that it is not slander to say that a white person is a Negro
are the following: Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S.W. 661
(1911) ; McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. 184 (1860) ; Wright v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (1936); Deese v. Collins, 191
N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926). Nor is it slander, actionable per se,
to call a person a "half-breed Mexican". Davis v. M ,eyer, 115 Neb.
251, 212 N.W. 435 (1927). That it is slander, actionable per se,
to call a white man a Negro, see Morris v. State, 109 Ark. 530, 160
S.W. 389 (1913); O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exchange, 153 S.W.
2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann.
423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Toye v. McMahon, 24 La. Ann. 308 (1868).
But it is generally held that words not actionable per se when spoken
may become so when written. Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 20
N.E. 2d 953 (1939); Tidniore v. Mills, 2 Div. 756, 32 So. 2d 769
(Ala. 1947). Whether the written statement that a white person
is a Negro is libelous per se seems to be controlled to a large extent
by local mores and social customs. A false written statement that
a white person is of one-fourth Negro blood is libelous per se in a
community in which there are marked social differences between the
races. Stultz v. Cousins, 242 Fed. 794, (6th Cir. 1917). It is li-
belous per se to call a white man a Negro in writing. Hargrove v.
Okla. Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 Pac. 635 (1928); Upton
v. Times Democrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1910).
One case, which seems to be sui generis, holds that whether to pub-
lish of a white woman that she is colored is libelous depends on the
circumstances. Jones v. R. L. Polk and Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So.
577 (1915). But even where it is libelous per se to refer to a white
person as a Negro, the courts will not extend the defamation to
include other members of plaintiff's family. In Oklahoma, it is li-
belous per se to write that a white woman is co-habiting with a Negro,
and libelous per se to call her husband a Negro, but it is not a libel
on her to call her husband a Negro. Hargrove v. Okla. Press Pub.
Co., supra. A newspaper publication referring to a white man as a
Negro is not a libel on his white parents where there was no refer-
ence, direct or indirect, to them. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 48
Ga. App. 273, 172 S.E. 647 (1934). But a corporation may be li-
beled by referring to one employee as a Negro. Publication that a
tobacco company placed a Negro foreman over white girls was held
libelous per se in Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co.,
169 Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916).
So far the question of equality under the United States Constitu-
19551
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tion has been given no weight by the courts. To call a white person
a Negro is defamatory and actionable, notwithstanding the 13th, 14th
and 15th amendments to the Federal Constitution, the court said in
Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745 (1914). The 14th
amendment, to the effect that no state shall abridge the privileges or
deny equal protection of the laws "has not destroyed the law of this
state making publication of a white man as a Negro anything but
libel." Flood v. News and Courier Co., 71 S.C. 112, 50 S.E. 637
(1905) ; Flood v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 71 S.C. 122, 50 S.E.
641 (1905). As authority for a de facto social distinction and the
inferiority of Negroes, the South Carolina court in the Flood cases
quotes the language of Justice Strong in Strauder v. W. Va., 10&
U. S. 303 (1880), "The colored race as a race was abject and ignor-
ant, and that condition was unfit to command the respect of those
who had superior intelligence." To the effect that equality extends
only to equal protection of law, and not to society, the court cites
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the father of the "separate
but equal" doctrine. But the Plessy case was overruled in so far as
it applied to public schools on May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of
Education, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. (Advance p. 583), raising the
question of whether constitutional equality might now constitute a
valid defense. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 151 F. 2d 733
(2nd Cir. 1945), does not squarely answer the question, but may be
indicative. In that case Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court,
held that it is libelous per se to write of a man that he is a Communist
sympathizer, even though this might not cause intelligent or "right
thinking" people to harbor ill feelings toward him. "It is enough
if there be some, as there certainly are, who would feel so, even
though they would be 'wrong thinking' people if they did." And, in
addition, a litigant not directly affected by a constitutional question
may not raise it. Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup et al., 299
U.S. 226 (1936).
The principal case, decided one week after the momentous segre-
gation cases, was on all fours with authority up to that time. The
question is whether the courts could stand in the same position now
that the foundation stone has been overturned. It appears doubtful
that the segregation cases have changed the law in this respect. Al-'
though the courts previously have based their decisions in such cases
on the Plessy case, they might reach the same conclusion on the basis
of the Grant case. Even if the Supreme Court were successful in
completely abolishing segregation and enforcing social equality, if a
[Vol. 7
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substantial portion of the community still believed Negroes to be
inferior, even if they were "wrong-thinking" people for doing so,
the plaintiff's reputation and standing in the community would be
damaged by writing of him that he was a Negro, and this would
constitute libel per se. But the Grant case, of course, applied only
to Communist sympathizers and the Supreme Court has not exerted
itself so strenuously in their behalf. A Communist sympathizer
would be likely to be held in disrepute by a substantial portion of
the population on a nationwide basis, whereas Negroes might be
considered inferior only in certain sections, and whether calling a
person a Negro would stand on the same footing as calling him a
Communist sympathizer is open. Under the authority of the Stultz
v. Cousins case, supra, however, the feelings of the community
would appear to govern and this case read with the Grant case leave
little doubt that the law is unchanged. The courts might obtain
the same result by the shortcut of ruling that the defendant in a libel
case, whose civil rights are not in issue, is not of a class of persons
to whom the segregation cases are available as a defense.
J. RiEst DANrUL.
INHERITANCE - Unintentional Killing of Wife As a Bar to
Right of Inheritance. This was an action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that defendant was not entitled to inherit from the estate of
the deceased. During an alleged unlawful assault upon a third per-
son, defendant killed his wife against whom he held no malice or
intention to kill. For this homicide he had been tried and acquitted.
In his answer to the complaint, defendant interposed as a defense
Sec. 19-5, CODE o-9 LAWS OF SourH CAROLINA, 1952, which provides
that "No person who shall be convicted in any court of competent
jurisdiction of unlawfully killing another person shall receive any
benefit from the death of the person unlawfully killed, except in cases
of involuntary manslaughter, whether by way of intestate succession,
will, vested or contingent remainder, or insurance or otherwise ......
The jury found for defendant, but the court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tion for judgment non obstante veredicto on the ground that the
only reasonable inference from the evidence was that defendant bad
unlawfully killed his wife and was therefore barred of his inheritance
from her. Defendant appealed. HELD: Reversed. The statute
interposed as a defense had no application since the defendant had
been acquitted. One who, in the course of an unlawful assault upon
1955]
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one person, kills another to whom he bears no malice and to whom
his criminal intent is not directed, is not barred of his right to inherit
from the latter. Legette, et al. v. Smith, 85 S.E. 2d 576 (S.C. 1955).
In the United States there is a three-way split of authority as to
whether or not the statutory right of inheritance, to which there are
no express exclusions, is barred from one who has murdered his
ancestor. The majority view is that under such circumstances the
murderer is not barred. Hagan v. Cone, 21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S.E.
602 (1917); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487,
L.R.A. 1916E 593 (1916); In re Duncan's Estates, 40 Wash. 2d
850, 246 P. 2d 445 (1952). Justification for this result has been
expressed thusly: "A statutory right cannot be defeated by the
application of a common law principle." Eversole v. Eversole, supra.
The minority rule bars the murderer of his statutory right of inheri-
tance and is based on the common law principle that one should not
be allowed to profit by his own wrong. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md.
505, 165 Atl. 470 (1933) ; Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d
525 (1945). These jurisdictions hold that the common law maxims
are to be applied when statutes are construed. A third view holds
that common law allows the property of the deceased to descend to
the murderer and that equity compels him to hold it as constructive
trustee for the person or persons who would have been heirs or next
of kin if the murderer had predeceased the intestate. Bryant v.
Bryant, 193 N.C. 372. 137 S.E. 188 (1927); RESTATEMENT, RimSTI-
TUTION Sec. 187 (2) (1937). In states which have statutes that bar
the right of inheritance under specified circumstances, the conditions
of the statute generally must be met. For example, Virginia has
held that under a statute which bars the right of inheritance from one
who has been convicted of killing the ancestor in order to obtain his
estate or an interest therein, that proof of unlawful homicide alone
is not sufficient to bar the right. Ward v. Ward, 174 Va. 331, 65
S.E. 2d 664 (1940). Lack of a conviction, in jurisdictions which
bar the right of inheritance if the heir has been convicted of murder-
ing the intestate, will allow the heir to inherit. Peeple v. Corbett, 117
Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934); Oberst v. Mooney, 135 Kan. 433, 10
P. 2d 846 (1932). In a case concerning the right of a beneficiary
of an insurance policy to the proceeds thereof, South Carolina com-
mitted itself to the common law principle that one should not be
allowed to profit by his own wrong, and in the absence of Sec. 19-5,
supra, falls within the minority view set out above. Smith v. Todd,
155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506, 70 A.L.R. 1579 (1930). At the same
[Vol. 7
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sitting the court construed Sec. 19-5, supra, to be a rule of evidence
in that a conviction which came within the statute was a determina-
tion in and of itself that the killer was barred from receiving any
benefit from the person killed. Thus, in a later case a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter rendered Sec. 19-5, supra, inapplicable,
and the common law principle was applied. Keels v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931). So, in the two
preceding cases the South Carolina court was not called upon to
determine the rights of a statutory heir to the estate of the ancestor
whom he had murdered. However, Massachusetts had applied the
test. which South Carolina in tle instant case adopted, to an analo-
gous situation. That jurisdiction held that a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy who unintentionally killed the insured is entitled to
the proceeds of the policy. Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295
Mass. 1, 3 N.E. 2d 17 (1936).
The instant case was of first impression in South Carolina and
was decided on a nice factual distinction. The result is commend-
able for the reason pointed out by the court-that commission of a
crime does not in itself work a forfeiture of the criminal's right to
inherit and that the intention of the criminal to kill the deceased
should be the controlling point. The common law principle that
one should not be allowed to profit from his own wrong is good,
and the constructive trustee rule is only a deviation from this principle
which ultimately reaches the same result. Both can be carried
logically to absurdities. Therefore, it appears that the South Caro-
lina court recognized a need for and drew the line of demarcation
at a proper place. However, the present decision can bring about
inequities unless the legislature acts to cure the defects. An illustra-
tion or two will suffice: If A intending to kill B, kills C instead but
is acquitted, A can inherit from C; on the other hand if A is convicted,
he cannot inherit since Sec. 19-5, CoDE or LAws Or SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952, is applicable. Likewise, it appears that one convicted of reck-
less homicide cannot inherit even though there is a total lack of in-
tention to kill the deceased.
Our court is further justified in the ultimate decision of the case
on another ground. The trial court instructed the jury that if they
found that the death of the deceased was not by an unlawful act,
that they should find for the defendant. This the jury did. There
being evidence to support the verdict as indicated by the Supreme
Court and the issues being essentially legal, the jury's verdict was
conclusive.
E. WINDEIL MCCRACKIN.
1955]
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LABOR LAW - State's Power to Enjoin Unfair Libor Practices.
Union workers on a building project called a strike and picketed
the job. No violence occurred. The general contractor sought an
injunction in the state court, alleging that the union was trying to
force him to compel the employees to join the union. The conduct
complained of was an unfair labor practice under the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (Taft-Hartley Act). The entire project
was located in the state of Pennsylvania, but several sub-contractors
on the job were from other states, and a great deal of the material
on the job came from other states. The defendants, the union,
moved for dismissal on the grounds that the state court had no
jurisdiction. The plaintiff took the position that publicly-announced
National Labor Relations Board jurisdictional "yardsticks" show that
the Board would refuse jurisdiction of the dispute, and that there-
fore the state courts should grant relief. HELD: preliminary injunc-
tion refused. The court believed that the Taft-Hartley Act placed
exclusive jurisdiction in the N.L.R.B. over activities designated in
the Act as unfair labor practices. No state court or state labor
board can enjoin these activities unless the Board cedes jurisdiction
according to the procedure outlined in the Act, regardless of the
Board's announced jurisdictional "yardsticks." Adelphia Construc-
tion Co. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Philadelphia, 29 Bucks.
County L. J. 143, 27 C.C.H. Labor Cases Par. 68,843, (Bucks
County, Penn., Court of Common Pleas, Nov. 3, 1954).
The Taft-Hartley Act gives to the N.L.R.B. the power to prevent,
through cease and desist orders of its own and through injunctions
in federal courts where necessary, activities which are designated
by the Act as "unfair labor practices", provided these activities are
affecting interstate commerce. The same section of the Act which
gives this power to the Board provides a method by which the Board
can cede some of its power to state labor boards, unless the state
law under which the state board operates is inconsistent with the
federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a). No other provision is made in
the statute for cession of Board power over unfair labor practices
to the states. In order for the N.L.R.B. to assume jurisdiction of a
case, no particular volume of interstate commerce need be affected,
so long as the volume is greater than that to which the courts would
apply the maxim de minimis. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & C.T.C.,
341 U.S. 681, 684 (1951); N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601,
607 (1939). Furthermore, it now seems to be settled that where
the unfair labor practice is one which the Board is empowered to
[Vol. 7
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prevent, a state court is without jurisdiction, unless the practice is
accompanied by violence, mass picketing, destruction of property, or
some similar threat to the peace of the community. Garner v. Team-
sters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). If the Board would take juris-
diction of every case which it has the power to decide, there would
be no problem, other than the Board's own problem as to how it
would have time to do its work. Under present law, however, the
Board has the right to determine for itself whether or not it will
accept jurisdiction over a particular case. Haleston Drug Stores v.
N.L.R.B., 187 F. 2d 418, 421 (9th cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
815 (1951). And the Board frequently refuses cases which it con-
siders to be of such a local nature that the national welfare is not
appreciably affected by them. This decision is purely a matter of
opinion, and there is often a great deal of disagreement among the
Board members on this question. See Breeding Transfer Co., 110
N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1954). Rather than decide its jurisdiction on
a case-by-case basis, the Board last July announced its latest set of
so-called jurisdictional "yardsticks." The yardsticks state a mini-
mum dollar volume of interstate commerce that various types of
business concerns must conduct annually in order for the N.L.R.B.
to take jurisdiction. But the yardsticks are not binding on the Board,
and they may be disregarded by it at any time. N.L.R.B. RlIuAsv
o1 JuLY 15, 1954. Therefore, the yardsticks are not an announce-
ment of what the Board will do, but rather what it will probably do.
The U. S. Supreme Court has expressly withheld its opinion on the
question of whether a state can exercise jurisdiction when the Board
refuses to do so through the application of its yardsticks; but the
Court has indicated that it recognizes that the question exists and
will rule on it in a proper case. Bldg. Trades Council v. Kinard Con-
struction Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954). The instant case holds that the
state courts cannot take jurisdiction in such a situation. It is in-
teresting to note that a federal district court has held the other
way on the same question, deciding that when the Board refuses
jurisdiction of a case for yardstick reasons, the complainant may
proceed in the state courts. The federal case was decided in Octo-
ber 1954, about a month earlier than the instant case. Your Food
Stores v. Retail Clerks Local, 124 F. Supp. 697 (D. N. M. 1954).
The principal question here is one of statutory interpretation.
Clearly, the N.L.R.B. has the discretionary power to refuse to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. But, did Congress intend that a complainant,
on being turned down by the Board for "yardstick" reasons, should
19551
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be without a forum which could hear his complaint? This is very
unlikely, since the purpose of the Act is the settlement of labor
disputes rather than the prolongation of them. However, the court
in the instant case believes that the law as it exists at present ex-
cludes the complainant from the state courts. On the other hand,
the court in Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks Local, supra, holds
to the maxim that "for every wrong there is a remedy," and if the
Board refuses to act for yardstick reasons, the state courts are free
to apply their own laws to the dispute.
It would seem that the court in the instant case is standing on
firm ground, legally, in view of the statute itself and the cases which
interpret it. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically provides that the
Board may cede jurisdiction to state agencies only when the state
labor law is consistent with Taft-Hartley. But if the Board can
cede jurisdiction by the simple step of narrowing its own jurisdic-
tion at will, then the statutory conditions for cession of power can
be by-passed. The instant decision would prevent such a by-pass.
However, the decision is rather difficult to justify on practical
grounds. If it is correct, a disconcerting situation is presented
to the employer or union which wants to complain of an unfair
labor practice. He is told, in effect, that unless the business con-
cern involved in the dispute is large enough to get him before the
N.L.R.B. or unless the dispute is marked with violence, mass picket-
ing, threatened disorder, etc., so as to get him before the state
court, there is no judicial or quasi-judicial body of any descrip-
tion which can grant him relief. He is in a "no-man's land" where
there is no remedy available. The only answer to this unusual
problem seems to be legislation. Congress should set out yard-
sticks by statute, or it should require the N.L.R.B. to set its own
yardsticks and then to adhere to them rigorously; in either event
there should be a specific statutory provision that unfair labor prac-
tices in industries falling outside the yardstick would be left to the
jurisdiction of the states.
WALTR A. RIuSER.
TORTS - Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur and Circumstantial Evi-
dence in Establishment of Liability Under Guest Passenger Statute.
This was an action by a father for the wrongful death of his child,
who was killed in an automobile collision while riding as guest
passenger of defendant. Defendant's car, while being driven 50 to
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55 M.P.H. on paved highway, went to the left side of the highway
and collided with oncoming auto resulting in decedent's death. The
trial failed to reveal why the automobile got on the wrong side of
the highway. The lower court directed verdict for the defendant on
the ground that reckless operation of the vehicle was not proved. On
appeal, HELD: Reversed on other grounds. The Supreme Court
of Iowa sustained the holding that a finding of recklessness in a case
of this character cannot be based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
although recklessness may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Neh-
ring v. Sinith, 243 Iowa 225, 49 N.W. 2d 831 (1951).
Guest passenger statutes, which have been passed by most of the
states, are intended to relieve owners and operators of liability to
guest passengers for mere simple or ordinary negligence in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. In Phillips v. Briggs, 215 Iowa 461, 245
N.W. 720 (1932), the Iowa Court in deciding a "guest passenger
case" said that they could find no case where any court had gone
so far as to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and, therefore,
create a presumption or inference of recklessness, and the inappli-
cability of the doctrine in actions under the guest passenger statute
has been upheld in subsequent decisions. Harvey v. Clark, 232 Iowa
729, 6 N.W. 2d 144 (1942); Herbert v. Allen, 241 Iowa 684, 41
N.W. 2d 240 (1950). Iowa does recognize the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur - where the plaintiff is injured by instrumentalities within
the exclusive control and management of the defendant and the hap-
pening of such injury was such as in the ordinary course of events
would not occur without a lack of dge care on the part of the de-
fendant; the happening of the injury itself permits, but does not
compel, a finding that the defendant was in fact negligent. Slife,
The Iowa Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 35 IOWA L. REv. 393
(1950). The failure to apply the doctrine in the present decisions
can apparently be firmly supported on either of two grounds. First,
although the doctrine has been held to apply where one vehicle
collides with another moving in the same direction, Harvey v. Borg,
218 Iowa 1228, 257 N.W. 190 (1934) ; Crochet v. A. & P. Truck
Line, 52 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 1951), by far the majority view is that
the doctrine is inapplicable to a collision between two oncoming ve-
hicles because of the lack of exclusive control and management of
all the instrumentalities in the driver of one of them. 9B BLASHVIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA oF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTiICE, § 5983 (1954).
The Iowa courts are in accord with this view. Schroeder v. Kinds-
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chuh, 221 Iowa 590, 294 N.W. 784 (1940); Welch v. Greenberg,
235 Iowa 159, 14 N.W. 2d 266 (1944).
Second, even where driver is in exclusive control of the only
automobile involved, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may give rise
to presumption of negligence, but it does not create an inference of
that misconduct necessary for liability under the guest statute. Min-
kovits v. Fine, 67 Ga. App. 176, 19 S.E. 2d 561 (1942). The Iowa
statute limits the liability of the owner or operator of a motor ve-
hicle to a guest to instances where the damage is the "result of the
driver of said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or because of the reckless operation by him of such motor
vehicle." Iowa Code § 321.494. Conduct arising from mere inad-
vertence, thoughtlessness or error of judgment, is not recklessness
within the meaning of the statute. Harvey v. Clark, supra. To be
reckless one must be more than negligent, but conduct may be reck-
less without being willful or wanton. Herbert v. Allen, supra;
Schneider v. Parish, 242 Iowa 1147, 49 N.W. 2d 535 (1950). To
permit recovery it must appear that the driver was proceeding with-
out heed of or concern for consequences, with no care, coupled with
a disregard for the safety of his guest. Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa
662, 10 N.W. 2d (1943) ; Siesseger v. Puth, 213 Iowa 164, 239 N.W.
46 (1931). The happening of an accident, in itself, does not estab-
lish recklessness. Duncan v. Lowe, 221 Iowa 1278, 268 N.W. 10
(1936).
The fact that the collision occurs on the left hand side of the road,
without more, will not support a finding of recklessness under the
guest statute. Wilson v. Oxborrow, 220 Iowa 1135, 264 N.W. 1
(1935) ; Brown v. Martin, 216 Iowa 1272, 248 N.W. 368 (1933) ;
nor will the fact that the driver falls asleep or permits himself to be
overcome by sleep. Paulson v. Hanson, 226 Iowa 858, 285 N.W.
189 (1939) ; Kaplan v. Kaplan, 213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682 (1931).
Failure to exercise sufficient care to see and appreciate the danger
is not of itself reckless disregard of consequences. Peter v. Thomas,
231 Iowa 985, 2 N.W. 2d 643 (1942). In order to take the question
of recklessness under the guest statute to the jury it must be shown
that the danger to the guest was known to the driver and he acted
in entire disregard of it, Peter v. Thomas, supra, or that the danger
was so obvious and apparent that the driver must have used no
care at all in failing to observe it. Russell v. Turner, 56 F. Supp.
455 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
The South Carolina Guest Passenger Statute limits liability to
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accidents which "shall have been intentional on the part of the owner
or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard
of the rights of others." CoDm op LAWS oV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 46-801. The purpose of the statute was to deny a guest a right
of action for simple or ordinary negligence. Oswald v. Weiner,
218 S.C. 206, 62 S.R. 2d 311 (1950). Heedlessness alone has been
held not sufficient to establish liability; conduct in "reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others" has been interpreted as improper or
wrongful conduct evincing reckless indifference of consequences.
Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935) ; Cummings
v. Tweed, 195 S.C. 173, 10 S.E. 2d 322 (1940).
The South Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
recognize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although holding that
negligence or recklessness may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence. Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7
S.R. 2d 641 (1940); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500,
20 S.E. 2d 153 (1942). A person being on the wrong side of the road
and injuring another is not as a matter of law absolutely liable; the
circumstances of the situation at that particular time must be con-
sidered. Sims v. Eleazer, 116 S.C. 41, 106 S.E. 854 (1920). In
the absence of direct evidence the plaintiff must show such circum-
stances as would justify the inference that the injury which caused
the death was due to the wrongful act of the defendant and not leave
the question to mere speculation or conjecture; but every other rea-
sonable conclusion need not be excluded, as long as proof of circum-
stances warranting a given inference is sufficient. Peak v. Fripp,
195 S.C. 324, 11 S.E. 2d 383 (1940); Morrow v. Evans, 223 S.C.
288, 75 S.E. 2d 598 (1953). Causative violation of an applicable
statute constitutes actionable negligence and warrants an inference
of recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness sufficient to carry this
issue to the jury. Ralls v. Saleeby, 178 S.C. 431, 182 S.E. 750
(1935); Morrow v. Evans, supra. In the recent case of Morrow
v. Evans, supra, the violation of the statute against traveling on the
wrong side of the highway was proved by circumstantial evidence,
and although no guest passenger was involved, recklessness and wan-
tonness were found, and the plaintiff was awarded punitive damages.
The guest passenger statute, which most of the states have adopted,
is intended to relieve owners or operators of liability to guests for
accidents resulting from simple negligence. Although it is difficult
to define with precision the degree of negligence or misconduct for
which the operator is liable, it is clear that the guest is not to recover
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where the driver's mere inadvertence or lack of diligence causes the
injury. The Latin phrase res ipsa loquitur has generally come to
mean that negligence can be inferred from the accident itself in
connection with its bare physical cause, without the aid of any other
evidence, when the accident is of a kind which according to the
common experiences of mankind does not occur in the absence of
negligence. It would seem to be sound legal reasoning to hold that
this doctrine is insufficient to prove lack of that degree of care re-
quired by the Guest Statute. The unexplained accident is just as
likely to have happened because of the driver's simple negligence, lack
of attention or even because of his attempt to avoid a collision, and the
operator should not be held liable in any of these events.
On the other hand, where the happening of the accident coupled
with other circumstances such as skid marks, position of vehicles
after collision and distance travelled after impact is sufficient to raise
the inference of recklessness, the question should properly be sub-
mitted to the jury.
W. BRANTLEY HARVEY, JR.
TORTS- Liability of Voluntary Unincorporated Non-Profit As-
sociation to a Member for Negligence. Plaintiff was a member of
defendant club, which was a voluntary unincorporated association
not operated for profit. The club was conducted by employees of
the association. Plaintiff brought action to recover damages from
said club for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him on unlighted
club premises negligently maintained. In the lower court judgment
was for the plaintiff. HELD: Reversed. The members of a volun-
tary unincorporated association are engaged in a common enterprise
and one is not liable to another for negligence of common agent
within the scope of his employment. Oneil v. Sea Bee Club, 118
N.E. 2d 175 (Ohio 1954).
It is a well established rule, since Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292
(Mass. 1850), that every person legally responsible is liable for his
personal negligence when such negligence is the proximate cause of
an injury to another. Steinnan v. Penn. R. R. Co., 54 F. 2d 1052,
(3rd Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 552 (1932) ; Ott-man v. In-
corporated Village of Rockville Centre, 275 N.Y. 270, 9 N.E. 2d
862 (1937). At common law an unincorporated association cannot
sue or be sued in the association's name as it is not a legal person.
This doctrine was clearly upheld by the United States Supreme Court
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in Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933);
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928). This rule, however,
has been changed or modified in most jurisdictions by statutes that
allow unincorporated associations to sue and/or be sued in the name
of the association. Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 10 Atl. 515
(1887); Bruns v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 242 S.W. 419 (Mo.
App. 1922). "All unincorporated associations may be sued and
proceeded against under the name and style by which they are usu-
ally known without naming the individual members of the associa-
tion." CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-15. An un-
incorporated association is in no sense a legal entity, and is not made
so by this statute. Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C.
498, 129 S.E. 830 (1925). Statutes permitting an unincorporated
association to sue and be sued in the association's name do not es-
tablish the substantive liability of the association to one of its mem-
bers for tort. Huth v. Humboldt, 61 Conn. 227, 23 Atl. 1084 (1891) ;
Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933). Volun-
tary unincorporated associations organized for social purposes on a
non-profit basis are not partnerships, South Shore Club v. People,
228 Ill. 75, 81 N.E. 805 (1907) ; Merriwether v. Atkhin, 137 Mo. App.
32, 119 S.W. 36 (1909); and when such an organization is princi-
pally created by the members for their convenience and amusement,
it is not a public charity which is relieved from tort liability under
the "Eleemosynary Doctrine." Langheim v. Denison Fire Dept.
Swimming Association, 237 Iowa 386, 21 N.W. 2d 295 (1946);
Dunn v. Brown Co. Agricultural Society, 46 Ohio St. 93, 18 N.E.
496 (1888). An association has no legal existence separate from its
members, Chicago Grain Trimmers Association v. Murphy, 389 IIl.
102, 58 N.E. 2d 906 (1945); Gillette v. Allen, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 307,
269 App. Div. 441 (1945) ; therefore, when suit is brought against
an unincorporated association for tort, it is against the members
generally. Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads,
132 F. 2d 408, 145 A.L.R. 694 (2d Cir. 1942); Pandolfo v. Bank
of Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921). Members of a voluntary
unincorporated association which was created for their pleasure are
engaged in a joint or common enterprise. Roach v. Harding, 348
Ill. 454, 181 N.E. 331 (1932); Clark v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W. 2d 404 (1931);
Koogler v. Koogler, supra. Members engaged in a common enter-
prise or the members of an unincorporated association are co-princi-
pals as to the agents of the association. Martin v. Northern P.
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Beneficial Association, 68 Minn. 521, 71 N.W. 701 (1897); Mar-
chitto v. Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey, 9 N. J. 456, 88 A. 2d
858 (1952). Co-principals are not allowed to sue each other for
the dereliction of a common agent within scope of agency. Murphy
v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389 (1939); Brotherhood of
R. R. Trainmen v. Allen, 230 S.W. 2d 327 (Texas 1950); Hromek
v. Geineinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
The doctrine of common or joint enterprise is a creature of the
American courts. It is generally held that the principal distinc-
tion between partnerships and joint enterprises is that the former
is for a general purpose while the latter is created for a specific pur-
pose. The basic essential of a joint enterprise is that the parties
intended to enter into a community of interest. The facts of the
principal case indicate that the parties were participants in a joint
enterprise and the court's holding would be sound in most jurisdic-
tions. The logic of the non-liability of one co-principal to the other
for the dereliction of a common agent within the scope of his em-
ployment is one of sound reasoning. The agent being hired to pro-
mote the community of interest of the co-principals, it therefore seems
just that any negligence committed by the agent within the scope of
his employment should be imputed to both principals. Plaintiff's
only cause of action would lie against those employees of the associ-
ation who were negligent.
ISADORZ E. LOURIE.
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